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1Binary-Ternary Plus-Minus Modular Inversion in
RNS
Karim Bigou and Arnaud Tisserand, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—A fast RNS modular inversion for finite fields arith-
metic has been published at CHES 2013 conference. It is based
on the binary version of the plus-minus Euclidean algorithm.
In the context of elliptic curve cryptography (i.e. 160–550 bits
finite fields), it significantly speeds-up modular inversions. In this
paper, we propose an improved version based on both radix 2
and radix 3. This new algorithm leads to 30 % speed-up for a
maximal area overhead about 4 % on Virtex 5 FPGAs.
Index Terms—Residue Number System, Modular Arithmetic,
Extended Euclidean Algorithm, ECC, FPGA.
I. INTRODUCTION
The origins of the residue number system (RNS) are very
old (at least 2000 years ago). During the fifties, its modern use
in computer arithmetic has been discussed in [33] and [19].
It uses a set of small moduli (m1,m2, . . . ,mn), called the
RNS base, where the moduli are pairwise coprime integers. An
integer X in RNS is split into n components (x1, x2, . . . , xn),
called the residues or remainders, with xi = X mod mi. Con-
version from the standard representation to RNS is straightfor-
ward. Thanks to the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT), one
can recover X in the classical representation from the residues
(see for instance [34, Chap. 3]).
In RNS, computations are divided into independent chan-
nels with one modulo mi per channel. Some operations are
very efficient in RNS: addition, subtraction and multiplication
are performed in parallel over the channels without carry prop-
agation between them. Exact division can also be performed
in parallel when the divisor is coprime with all the moduli.
However, sign/overflow detection, comparison, general divi-
sion and modular reduction [2] operations are more complex
in RNS and require a lot of precomputations. Furthermore,
RNS is not directly supported by hardware description lan-
guages and computer aided design (CAD) tools (involving an
important development and debug cost).
RNS has been used more recently to accelerate computa-
tions in asymmetric cryptography over very large operands for
RSA (1024–4096 bits) [27], [4], [25], [30]; elliptic curve cryp-
tography (ECC, 160–550 bits) [31], [26], [20]; pairings [14],
[17]; and very recently lattice based cryptography [3]. Thanks
to its non-positional property, RNS can be used to randomize
the order of internal computations as a protection against some
side channel attacks [5], [15], [29]. RNS has also been used as
a protection against fault injection attacks with an additional
channel dedicated to fault detection [15], [21].
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In RNS cryptographic hardware implementations, modular
inversion was mainly implemented using Fermat’s little the-
orem (FLT) [20], [7]. In our paper at CHES 2013 [10], we
proposed a significantly faster RNS modular inversion based
on the binary extended Euclidean algorithm and the plus-
minus trick from [12].
In this paper, we propose a new mixed binary-ternary
algorithm for RNS modular inversion. Adding small modulo 3
units, we can reduce the number of iterations by 1/3 compared
to our binary solution from [10]. For typical ECC field sizes
on a Virtex-5 FPGA, our new binary-ternary version leads to
30 % faster modular inversions with only 4 % area overhead
compared to [10].
The paper is organized as follows. Section II defines our no-
tations. Section III briefly describes state-of-the-art methods.
Our new binary-ternary algorithm is detailed in Section IV and
compared to state-of-the-art in Section V. Architecture and
FPGA implementation are presented in Section VI. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Notations and definitions of some precomputations used in
this paper are:
• P an `-bit prime integer (for ECC ` ≈ 160–550 bits).
• Capital letters, e.g. X , denote large integers or elements
of FP .
• A the argument to be inverted and X,Y unspecified
variables.
• |X|P denotes X mod P .
• n the number of moduli in the RNS base.
• mi a w-bit modulo, mi = 2w − ri and ri < 2bw/2c (mi
is a pseudo Mersenne [16]).
• B = (m1, . . . ,mn) is the RNS base, where all mi are
pairwise coprime and all mi are odd
•
−→
X represents X in RNS base B, i.e. −→X = (x1, . . . , xn)
where xi = |X|mi .
• M =
∏n
i=1mi
•
−→
TB =
(∣∣∣ Mm1 ∣∣∣m1 , . . . ,
∣∣∣ Mmn ∣∣∣mn
)
• FLT: Fermat’s little theorem (e.g. [35, chap. 4.4])
• CRT: Chinese remainder theorem (e.g. [22, chap. 3.4])
• EMM: one elementary modular multiplication (w×w)-bit
• EMA: one elementary modular addition (w ± w)-bit
• MI: modular inversion
• PM: plus-minus trick from [12]
• BMI: RNS MI using binary PM algorithm from [10]
• BTMI: new RNS MI binary-ternary PM algorithm
2III. STATE-OF-THE-ART
One can find comprehensive surveys on RNS in [34], [32]
(mainly for signal processing applications). For RNS material
related to MI in the context of asymmetric cryptography, one
can refer, for instance, to [10, Sec. 3].
Efficient ECC implementations use projective coordinates
to perform the scalar multiplication without intermediate MIs.
But to convert back to a standard and unique representation
(e.g. NIST [28]), at least one final MI is required. In RNS, this
final MI usually represents around 10–15 % of the computation
cost of a scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve (see [7]
or [8, Sec. 2.1]). As stated in [14], pairings also require
costly inversion. The authors of this paper report: “[. . . ] the
remaining inversion in Fp is very expensive. Since comparison
in RNS is difficult, inversion through exponentiation (X−1 ≡
Xp−2 mod p) is used”.
In standard positional representations, MI is usually per-
formed using the extended Euclidean algorithm or FLT. But in
RNS, most of algorithms and implementations in the literature
use FLT.
FLT states |AP−1|P = 1 with P a prime integer and A
an integer coprime with P . Then, one deduces |AP−2|P =
|A−1|P . FLT based MI performs the modular exponentiation
|AP−2|P . For RSA, fast RNS modular exponentiations were
proposed in [18] and [30]. For ECC, FLT-based RNS MI
is used in [20] (which can be optimized using some tricks
proposed later in [18]). The main advantage of FLT-based MI
in RNS is that no specific inversion unit is required. Using
a square-and-multiply algorithm, the complexity of the FLT-
based RNS MI is O(`× n2) EMMs (see [10] for details).
In non-RNS implementations, MI can be performed using
the well known extended Euclidean algorithm [24]. An RNS
version of the Euclidean algorithm has been proposed in [6]
where quotients have been replaced by approximations. The
complexity of this solution has been partially evaluated, and
no implementation results are reported. Up to recently, the
Euclidean algorithm for RNS MI was not popular since it
requires comparisons which are costly operations in RNS.
Our work [10] circumvents this issue replacing comparisons
by cheap modulo 4 tests and the plus-minus (PM) trick
from [12]. Due to the use of modulo 4 tests, we call it the
binary PM modular inversion (BMI). The complexity of this
algorithm is only O(`× n) EMMs. On a Virtex-5 FPGA, BMI
leads to 6 to 12 times faster MI than FLT-based solutions
using a similar silicon area (see details in [10]). Since the
publication of [10], we implemented our MI solutions with
more parameters. Figure 1 reports a typical comparison of the
MI based on FLT and BMI from [10] on a 384-bit field but for
a larger set of parameters than our previous work (complete
results for other field sizes and parameters are reported in the
PhD document [8]). This figure shows the speedup obtained
on FPGA and confirms that the cost of our BMI solution is
only O(`× n) EMMs instead of O(`× n2) for FLT.
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Fig. 1. Implementation results for FLT MI and BMI from [10] for 384 bits
on Virtex 5 FPGA (more n parameters than [10]).
IV. PROPOSED BINARY-TERNARY PLUS-MINUS
ALGORITHM
A. Main Objectives and Ideas
One modular inversion (MI) is required at the end of fast
ECC scalar multiplication to convert back from projective
coordinates. Similarly to the state-of-the-art solutions, we
think that designing a dedicated MI unit is useless (such a unit
would be idle about 85–90 % of time). In [10], we decided
to slightly adapt the Cox-Rower architecture from state-of-
the-art, originally proposed for RSA modular exponentiation
in [23], [27], and optimized for ECC scalar multiplication
in [20]. Hence, we mainly reused all the RNS operators used
for the other operations (mainly additions, subtractions and
multiplications over FP ), adding very small computations (on
2-bit values).
In this section, we introduce a new RNS MI algorithm,
called the binary-ternary plus-minus (BTMI) algorithm based
on division and modulo operations by 3, 6 and 12 in addition
to those by 2 and 4 of [10]. These modulo 3 tests enable us to
significantly reduce the number of loop iterations with a very
small area overhead.
B. Proposed algorithm: BTMI
Our new proposition is presented in Algo. 1. All the values
are represented in an affine transformation X̂ of RNS, which
is presented in Sec. IV-C.
As in [10], it is based on the plus-minus algorithm proposed
initially for the binary standard representation in [12]. First,
similarly to [10], we divide V3 by 2 but also by 3 as much
as possible using the divup function (see Sec. IV-D) and the
functions mod3 and mod4 (see Sec. IV-C). Thus, after the inner
loop at lines 5–6, values are neither even nor divisible by 3.
Hence, we can perform a modulo 6 version of the plus-minus
trick to avoid comparisons, which are hard and costly in RNS.
If two integers X and Y are odd and not multiple of 3, then
X+Y or X−Y is a multiple of 6. Values X+Y and X−Y are
ensured to be even, we only have to test the value modulo 3 (at
line 8) to choose the sum or the difference. Then we also check
if the sum or the difference is a multiple of 4. It happens when
|X+Y |4 = |X+Y |6 = 0 or |X−Y |4 = |X−Y |6 = 0 (with a
probability of 0.5). Then, we divide by 6 (lines 16 and 25) or
by 12 (lines 12 and 21). As the original plus-minus algorithm
3and [10], one uses small values u and v to balance the number
of divisions between U3 and V3 (instead of using comparisons
as in the standard binary Euclidean algorithm). For instance,
if V3 is divided by 2, then one performs v ← v+1, v ← v+2
for a division by 4 and v ← v + σ for a division by 3, where
σ ≈ log2(3) (in practice selecting σ = 1.5 is sufficient). Then,
if v > u, one swaps U3 and V3 (lines 26–28). Finally, the
lines 31–34 converts X̂ into
−→
X .
Thanks to the use of higher divisors, BTMI requires less
main loop iterations than BMI from [10]. But it requires more
precomputations (10 RNS additional values). The cost of our
new algorithm is analyzed in Sec. V, the number of EMMs is
reduced by 30 % compared to our original BMI.
Adding additional modulo tests, such as 5 or 7, and the
corresponding divisors is possible but with a high increase in
the number of precomputed values. Moreover, the probability
for an intermediate value to be a multiple of a 5 is 1/5, for 7
it is 1/7, etc. The same thing occurs for scalar recoding using
multiple base number systems (MBNS, see for instance [13]).
Then the overall gain may be reduced compared to the
additional silicon and control cost.
C. Affine Transformation and Auxiliary Functions mod3 and
mod4
In Algo. 1, we need exact divisions and efficient modular
reductions by 2, 3, 4, 6 and 12. To compute them efficiently,
we propose to slightly modify the RNS representation during
the execution of the modular inversion. This representation is a
simple affine transformation defined by X̂ =
−−−−−−−−−−→
(X + C0)T
−1
B ,
with C0 > P and |C0|12 = 0, for instance
−→
C0 =
−−→
12P . It is an
adaptation of the one proposed in [10] but considering the fact
that we need modulo 3 now. Conversion between
−→
X and X̂
only requires one RNS multiplication and one RNS addition.
This conversion is performed only once at the beginning of
the inversion and the opposite conversion is required at the
end of the algorithm. This representation exactly behaves as
standard RNS and can be directly mapped on the Cox-Rower
architecture. It only requires a few additional bits (2 to 4 for
our target finite fields).
To simplify the modulo computations (and the equations)
we assume all (odd) moduli in B such that |mi|12 = 1 i.e.
|mi|4 = 1 and |mi|3 = 1. Without this small constraint, one
has |mi|4 = ±1 and |mi|3 = ±1. To compute |X|4 from
X̂ = (x̂i), we use the reduction modulo 4 of the CRT (as
in [10]):
|X|4 =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
|x̂i|4 − |q|4
∣∣∣∣∣
4
, (1)
where q =
⌊∑n
i=1 x̂i
M
mi
M
⌋
. We denote mod4 the function which
computes Eqn. (1). It evaluates the two terms
∣∣∣∑ni=1 |x̂i|4∣∣∣
4
and |q|4 and subtract them modulo 4.
To compute values modulo 3, we use a similar formula:
|X|3 =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
|x̂i|3 − |q|3
∣∣∣∣∣
3
. (2)
Algorithm 1: Proposed Binary-Ternary Plus-Minus RNS
Modular Inversion (BTMI).
Input:
−→
A ,P > 2 with gcd(A,P ) = 1
Precomp.:
−→
TB ,
−−→
T−1B ,
−→
C1
Result:
−→
S =
−−−−−→|A−1|P , 0 6 S < 2P
1 u← 0, v ← 0, Û1 ← 0̂ , V̂1 ← 1̂, V̂3 ← Â
2 bU1 ← 0, tU1 ← 0, bU3 ← |P |4, tU3 ← |P |3
3 bV1 ← 1, tV1 ← 1, bV3 ← mod4(V̂3), tV3 ← mod3(V̂3)
4 while V̂3 6=1̂ and Û3 6=1̂ and V̂3 6=−̂1 and Û3 6=−̂1 do
5 while |bV3 |2 = 0 or tV3 = 0 do
6 divup
(
V̂3, bV3 , tV3 , V̂1, bV1 , tV1 , v
)
7 V̂ ∗3 ← V̂3 , V̂ ∗1 ← V̂1
8 if |tV3 + tU3 |3 = 0 then
9 if |bV3 + bU3 |4 = 0 then
10 r = 1
11 V̂3 ← d̂iv12(V̂3 + Û3 −
−→
C1 , 0, 0)
12 V̂1 ←
d̂iv12(V̂1+Û1−
−→
C1 , |bV1+bU1 |4, |tV1+tU1 |3)
13 else
14 r = 0
15 V̂3 ← d̂iv6(V̂3 + Û3 −
−→
C1 , 2, 0)
16 V̂1 ←
d̂iv6(V̂1+ Û1−
−→
C1 , |bV1 + bU1 |4, |tV1 + tU1 |3)
17 else
18 if |bV3 − bU3 |4 = 0 then
19 r = 1
20 V̂3 ← d̂iv12(V̂3 − Û3 +
−→
C1 , 0, 0)
21 V̂1 ←
d̂iv12(V̂1−Û1+
−→
C1 , |bV1−bU1 |4, |tV1−tU1 |3)
22 else
23 r = 0
24 V̂3 ← d̂iv6(V̂3 − Û3 +
−→
C1 , 2, 0)
25 V̂1 ←
d̂iv6(V̂1− Û1+
−→
C1 , |bV1 − bU1 |4, |tV1 − tU1 |3)
26 if v > u then
27 Û3 ← V̂ ∗3 , bU3 ← bV3 , tU3 ← tV3
28 Û1 ← V̂ ∗1 , bU1 ← bV1 , tU1 ← tV1 , swap(u, v)
29 bV3 ← mod4(V̂3), tV3 ← mod3(V̂3)
30 bV1 ← mod4(V̂1), tV1 ← mod3(V̂1), v ← v + r + σ
31 if V̂3 = 1̂ then return (V̂1 −
−→
C1 )
−→
TB +
−→
P
32 else if Û3 = 1̂ then return (Û1 −
−→
C1 )
−→
TB +
−→
P
33 else if V̂3 = −̂1 then return −(V̂1 −
−→
C1 )
−→
TB +
−→
P
34 else return −(Û1 −
−→
C1 )
−→
TB +
−→
P
However, modulo 3 reduction on x̂i in the channels are
w-bit operators (see for instance [9]) and not only 2 LSBs
as for modulo 4 because inside the channels values use the
binary representation. This leads to very small extra hardware
resources for each channel (see Sec. VI). The function mod3
computes Eqn. (2).
4To compute mod3 and mod4, the value q =
⌊∑n
i=1 x̂i
M
mi
M
⌋
must be computed. As in fast state-of-the-art ECC implemen-
tations in RNS, we use a small dedicated unit, called Cox
unit to compute an approximation q′ of q, see [23]. This
unit is required to compute efficient modular multiplication in
asymmetric cryptographic implementation in RNS. The Cox
sums up the t most significant bits of each residue, here x̂i.
Typically, state-of-the-art solutions use t ∈ [4, 6] (see [23]
for details). The Cox approximation q′ proposed in [23] only
works for positive intermediate values. Using the plus-minus
trick, intermediate values are in the interval ] − P, P [. Using
our X̂ representation, values are now in ]C0 − P,C0 + P [,
for instance ]11P, 13P [ for
−→
C0 =
−−→
12P . Using the results
from [23], we set t = 6 to ensure q′ = q for all considered
field sizes and parameters. The parameter t = 6 is required
for the largest fields, but one can use t = 4 or t = 5 for the
smaller ones. The cost of the evaluation of q is n additions
of t-bit values [23]. This computation is shared for both mod4
and mod3 computations.
The computation dedicated to mod4 costs n + 2 additions
modulo 4 (2-bit values) to evaluate Eqn. 1, which are actually
negligible compared to the RNS additions and multiplications
performed during the inversion algorithm. The one dedicated
to mod3 costs n + 2 additions modulo 3. Additions modulo
3 are additions on 2-bit values and are also negligible. Re-
ductions modulo 3 of w-bit values only require very small
hardware units (see Sec. VI and [9]), then we can neglect
them compared to RNS operations (RNS additions and mul-
tiplications).
D. Auxiliary Functions d̂ivD and divup
In the BMI algorithm from [10], we just need to perform
divisions by 2 or 4 modulo P for the BMI. For our new BTMI
Algo. 1, more cases are required (divisions by 3, 6, 12 are
added), thus we present how to perform all these divisions
and modulo using a function called divup.
In RNS, an exact division by D can be performed through
a multiplication by |D−1|M when D and M are co-prime, the
condition is to precompute |D−1|M (in RNS the reduction by
the product of moduli M is automatic). For the modular inver-
sion algorithm, the divisions are actually performed modulo P
(and not modulo M ). But, when X is a multiple of D, then
X/D = |XD−1|M ≡ |XD−1|P . We recall that we select M
such that gcd(12,M) = 1, P is prime; and in RNS M > X
to be able to represent X , thus X/D < M .
However, X is not always a multiple of D (where D ∈
{2, 3, 4, 6, 12}) in our modular inversion algorithm. To solve
this issue, one can compute (X+fD(X)P )/D with fD(X) ≡
−XP−1 mod D, in other words X+fD(X)P is a multiple of
D and X + fD(X)P ≡ X mod P . Actually fD(X) is com-
puted from the value |X|D thanks to mod3 or mod4 functions,
but we choose to simplify the writing of fD(|X|D) by fD(X).
As an example, we report the values of fD for D = 2, 3, 4, 6
and |P |6 = 1 in Table I. If we choose fD(X) ∈ [0, D − 1],
one must store (D − 2)P values (0 and P do not need
extra storage). Choosing fD(X) ∈ [−
⌈
D
2
⌉
+ 1,
⌈
D
2
⌉ − 1]
enables to divide by 2 the number of stored values, but it can
introduce negative intermediate values which must be managed
by choosing C0 >
(⌈
D
2
⌉ − 1)P , i.e. C0 > 5P for D = 12
(for instance C0 = 12P ) in the X̂ representation.
To formally define the division function, called d̂ivD, we
denote
−→
C1 =
−−−−−→
C0T
−1
B and
−→
P1 =
−−−−→
PT−1B , and thus X̂ =−−−−−−−−→
XT−1B + C1 . Then
d̂ivD(X̂,D, |X|D) = X̂
D
+ fD(X)
−→
P1
D
+
−−−−−−−→
(D − 1)C1
D
. (3)
In Eqn. 3, we recall that |X|D is required to compute fD(X).
More, the last term
−−−−−−−→
(D−1)C1
D is added to ensure that the result
is in the X̂ representation because
X̂
D
+
−−−−−−−→
(D − 1)C1
D
=
−→
X T−1B
D
+
−→
C1
D
+
−−−−−−−→
(D − 1)C1
D
= (̂X/D).
To speed up the computations, we can precompute the
possible combinations of the constants fD(X)
−→
P1
D +
−−−−−−−→
(D−1)C1
D .
Then, d̂ivD costs one RNS multiplication and one addition by
a constant in each channel, i.e. n EMMs +n EMAs.
We present in Algo. 2 the function divup, which uses mod3,
mod4 and d̂ivD for the various D to manage all possible cases
in the inversion algorithm. This function performs the division
(modulo P ) by the greatest divisor possible, according to the
values modulo 3 (e.g. tV3 ) and 4 (e.g. bV3 ). After the division,
we compute mod3 for control values tV3 and tV1 , and mod4
for control values bV3 and bV1 . Finally, in order to update
u and v, we need to evaluate the number of “suppressed”
bits during the divisions by 3, we use σ an approximation
of log2(3) ≈ 1.5849. In practice, using σ = 1.5 is accurate
enough for our target finite fields.
To optimize the function divup, we can limit the number
of calls to mod3 and mod4 functions. For instance, after a
division by 3, it is not necessary to use the function mod4, we
can directly get the new value modulo 4 from bX multiplying
by 3−1 mod 4 = 3 and adding a small specific precomputed
value. Formally, defining bX ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2} and tX ∈
{−1, 0, 1} such that bX ≡ bX mod 4 and tX ≡ tX mod 3
respectively, we define
update4(bX , tX) =
∣∣3 (bX + (2|P |3 − 3) tX P )∣∣4 ,
update3 2(tX , bX) =
∣∣2 (tX + |bX |2 P )∣∣3 and
update3 4(tX , bX , bY ) =
∣∣(tX + (|P |4 − 2) bX P )∣∣3 .
These functions compute the new values modulo 3 or 4, with-
out mod3 or mod4. In practice, these equations are simplified
because P is fixed.
TABLE I
DEFINITION OF FUNCTIONS fD FOR D = 2, 3, 4, 6 AND |P |6 = 1.
|X|6 0 1 2 3 4 5
f2(X) 0 1 0 1 0 1
f3(X) 0 -1 1 0 -1 1
f4(X) 0 -1 2 1 0 -1
f6(X) 0 -1 -2 3 2 1
5Algorithm 2: divup Function.
Input: V̂3, bV3 , tV3 , V̂1, bV1 , tV1 ,v
Precomp.: α
−→
C1 and β
−−−−−→
(PT−1B ) with
α ∈ { 12 , 23 , 34 , 56 , 1112} and
β ∈ { 112 , 16 , 14 , 13 , 512 , 12 , −512 , −13 , −14 , −16 , −112 }
Output: V̂3, bV3 , tV3 , V̂1, bV1 , tV1 ,v
1 case bV3 = 0 and tV3 = 0
2 V̂3 ← d̂iv12
(
V̂3, bV3 , tV3
)
,
V̂1 ← d̂iv12
(
V̂1, bV1 , tV1
)
bV3 ← mod4(V̂3),
bV1 ← mod4(V̂1), tV3 ← mod3(V̂3), tV1 ← mod3(V̂1),
v ← v + σ + 2
3 case bV3 = 2 and tV3 = 0
4 V̂3 ← d̂iv6
(
V̂3, bV3 , tV3
)
, V̂1 ← d̂iv6
(
V̂1, bV1 , tV1
)
bV3 ← mod4(V̂3), bV1 ← mod4(V̂1), tV3 ← mod3(V̂3),
tV1 ← mod3(V̂1), v ← v + σ + 1
5 case bV3 = 0 and tV3 6= 0
6 V̂3 ← d̂iv4
(
V̂3, bV3
)
,V̂1 ← d̂iv4
(
V̂1, bV1
)
,
tV3 ← update3 4(tV3 , bV3),
tV1 ← update3 4(tV1 , bV1) , v ← v + 2,
bV3 ← mod4(V̂3), bV1 ← mod4(V̂1)
7 case bV3 6= 0, 2 and tV3 = 0
8 V̂3 ← d̂iv3
(
V̂3, tV3
)
, V̂1 ← d̂iv3
(
V̂1, tV1
)
,
bV3 ← update4(bV3 , tV3), bV1 ← update4(bV1 , tV1),
v ← v + σ, tV3 ← mod3(V̂3), tV1 ← mod3(V̂1)
9 case bV3 = 2 and tV3 6= 0
10 V̂3 ← d̂iv2
(
V̂3, bV3
)
, V̂1 ← d̂iv2
(
V̂1, bV1
)
,
tV3 ← update3 2(tV3 , bV3),
tV1 ← update3 2(tV1 , bV1), v ← v + 1,
bV3 ← mod4(V̂3), bV1 ← mod4(V̂1)
V. COMPARISON TO STATE-OF-THE-ART
In this section, we compare our BTMI algorithm to the best
state-of-the-art algorithm (BMI from [10]). The comparison
focuses on full RNS operations (additions/multiplications), and
not on very small operations specific to mod3 reductions. These
small reductions are performed in parallel using very small
hardware resources, as presented in Sec. VI. Then, the cost of
mod3 and mod4 are neglected in this analysis.
Each algorithm BMI and BTMI mainly performs a loop with
O(l) iterations. First we compare the cost of one outer loop
iteration of each algorithm (the structures of both algorithms
are very similar).
In BMI [10], the cost of one inner loop iteration is 2 d̂ivD
leading to 2n EMMs and 2n EMAs. There is on average 2/3
inner loop iteration per outer loop iteration. After the inner
loop, the plus-minus trick is performed with 2 d̂ivD and 2
RNS additions. Thus each outer loop iteration costs on average
3.33n EMMs and 5.33n EMAs. For a `-bit field, there are 0.71`
outer loop iterations, leading to 2.37n` EMMs and 3.79n` EMAs
on average.
For the BTMI algorithm proposed in this paper, one per-
forms one divup per inner loop iteration, leading to 2 d̂ivD
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Fig. 2. BMI vs BTMI comparison of the theoretical number of EMMs and
EMAs for n fixed (left) or ` fixed (right).
and 2n EMMs and 2n EMAs. On average there is 0.75 inner
loop iteration per outer loop iteration (we tested more than
700 000 simulations). After the inner loop, 2 d̂ivD and 2 RNS
additions are performed leading to an average cost of 3.5n
EMMs and 5.5n EMAs for each outer loop iteration. Thus a loop
iteration of our algorithm is slightly more costly than BMI.
However, the number of outer loop iterations is reduced: one
only has 0.46` outer loop iterations on average. Then the total
average cost of the outer loop is 1.61n` EMMs and 2.53n` EMAs.
Fig. 2 graphically compares the theoretical complexities for
BMI and BTMI for ` fixed (and n variable) or ` variable
(and n fixed). On average, BTMI reduces by 30 % the number
of EMMs and EMAs compared to BMI but it increases the
number of precomputations by a factor 2.2 (but current FPGAs
embed large enough BRAMs to hide this overhead) for ECC
applications.
VI. ARCHITECTURE AND FPGA IMPLEMENTATION
We use the Cox-Rower architecture for modular multipli-
cations originally proposed in [23] (in the RSA context) and
optimized in several RNS papers (see for instance [20], [14]
in the ECC context). As in our previous paper [10], we do not
implement a dedicated modular inversion unit (it would be
idle about 85–90 % of time). We prefer to slightly modify the
Cox-Rower architecture to support also modular inversions for
silicon efficiency purpose. Our modifications do not reduce the
speed of other RNS operations during scalar multiplication.
Our new overall Cox-Rower architecture supporting BTMI
is depicted in Fig. 3. This architecture is an extension of the
BMI one presented in [10]. Control signals, clock signal and
reset ones are just partially represented in Fig. 3. Short lines
terminated by white circles (i.e. ) represent control signals.
The computations on w-bit residues modulo mi in each
channel are performed in a dedicated Rower unit. In this
work, we use a full parallel architecture with n Rowers for n
channels similarly to state-of-the-art solutions. Our new Rower
architecture is detailed in Fig. 4.
There are two main differences between the architecture
for the binary version (BMI, published in [10]) and our new
binary-ternary version BTMI: i) each Rower has to compute
the residue modulo 3 of the xi and transfer this 2-bit value
to the Cox unit; ii) additional precomputations are required to
handle modulo 3 cases.
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CTRL
(shared)
local reg.
{@, en, r/w}
Arithmetic Unit
(6 pipeline stages)
{rst, mode, . . .}
ww
w
w w
IN
w
OUT
w
mod3
OUT mod3
2
cmp
w
= 1̂ = −̂1
precomp.
mult.
≈ 2n × w w
@1
precomp.
ri (×2)
@2
dlo
g
2
r i
e
precomp.
add.
38 × w
@3
w
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Each Rower contains one arithmetic unit, a few local regis-
ters and small ROMs (read only memories) for precomputed
values. In each Rower, a small unit, in the dotted region in
Fig. 4, computes the modulo 3 reduction |x̂i|3 of the output
residue of the arithmetic unit. Modulo 3 reduction is a very
small combinatorial unit. Tab. II presents its implementation
results on Xilinx Virtex 5 LX220 FPGA for various sizes w.
This very small additional unit is not on the critical path of
the Rower, then it does not reduce the overall architecture fre-
quency. The new additive precomputations required for divup
are stored in the local “precomp. add.” memory (bottom left
memory in Fig. 4). In BTMI, 38 words of w bits are required
while only 17 were used in BMI. The new multiplicative
precomputations are stored in the “precomp. mult.” memory
TABLE II
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS OF w-BIT MODULO 3 UNITS ON VIRTEX 5.
w (bits) 17 20 22 24 29 33 36
Area (slices) 6 6 6 6 10 10 11
Freq. (MHz) 275 230 221 218 162 161 170
(top left in Fig. 4) for values 13 ,
1
6 , and
1
12 , leading to 2n+ 7
w-bit words per Rower instead of 2n+4 in [10]. In our target
FPGAs, those additional precomputations still fit the BRAMs
(36Kb each in Virtex 5 FPGAs), then there is no area overhead
at this level.
In Cox-Rower architecture in Fig. 3, the small (red) squares
just select the t MSBs and 2 LSBs of the w-bit output residue
of each Rower (which is just routing) to compute the global q
value (see Sec. IV-C and [10]). In the BTMI architecture, new
2-bit wires transfer |x̂i|3 from each Rower to the Cox unit. All
these 2-bit values are summed up and reduced modulo 3 in
the Cox to produce the value |s|3 =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
|x̂i|3
∣∣∣∣∣
3
.
Tab. III summarizes the new hardware resources for BTMI
compared to BMI from [10] in Rowers, Cox and global
Cox-Rower control. The finite state machine in the global
Cox-Rower control is increased by few states, and there are
now 8 control values of 2 bits (corresponding to bVi , bUi , tVi
and tUi with i ∈ {1, 3}) due to modulo 3 units.
We estimated the area overhead and speedup for our new
BTMI architecture compared to BMI one for several sets of
parameters (field size `, number of channels n and channel
width w). For area overhead, Tab. IV reports typical obtained
values, the worst case is at most 4 %. For speedup, Fig. 5
7TABLE III
SUMMARY OF CHANGES BETWEEN OF OUR PREVIOUS BMI
ARCHITECTURE AND OUR NEW BTMI ON VIRTEX 5 FPGA.
Unit Sub-unit BMI BTMI
Rower
mod3 0 6–11 slices
Mem. (w-bit words) 17 38
BRAM 1 or 2 1 or 2
Cox mod3 0 6–11 slices
CTRL
FSM 25 states 30 states
2-bit values 4 8
TABLE IV
TYPICAL GLOBAL AREA OVERHEAD OF BTMI COMPARED TO BMI
IMPLEMENTATIONS ON VIRTEX 5 FPGA.
field size ` (bits) 192 256 384 521
min overhead (%) 2.9 3.1 2.9 2.1
max overhead (%) 3.6 3.4 3.1 2.5
compares the execution time of a full modular inversion
on Virtex 5 FPGA for FLT, BMI and BTMI architectures
on various field sizes. FLT architecture is far slower than
Euclidean based architectures with binary BMI from [10] and
our new binary-ternary BTMI. BTMI is 30 % faster than BMI
since the number of operations is reduced by 30 % and the
clock frequency is maintained.
For the validation of both BTMI algorithm and architecture,
we used the same strategy than [10] for BMI. Proving at high
level the correctness of Euclidean based algorithms, as our
BMI and BTMI, is not very difficult since V1A ≡ V3 mod P
and U1A ≡ U3 mod P are always true (see for instance [24,
Sec 4.5.2]). But formally proving the average number of loop
iterations is highly difficult (see for instance [1]). We used
intensive simulations to estimate the actual number of loop
iterations. Those simulations were performed using a computer
algebra system (Maple 15) for all algorithms over 700 000
random operands for P-192, P-256, P-384 and P-521 primes
from [28].
 10
 100
 200  300  400  500
in
ve
rs
io
n 
tim
e 
[µs
]
field size (log P) [bits]
−30%
FLT from [18]
BMI from [10]
BTMI (this paper)
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sizes and algorithms (FLT and BMI from [10] and the proposed BTMI.)
VII. CONCLUSION
A new fast RNS modular inversion algorithm has been
proposed. This algorithm is based on the binary extended Eu-
clidean algorithm, as the state-of-the-art one proposed in [10].
In the new algorithm, the number of iterations in the main
loop is reduced compared to [10], reducing the number of
operations by 30 %, thanks to cheap modulo 3 tests and
divisions by {2, 3, 4, 6, 12}. The added hardware resources for
modulo 3 computations are very small and do not reduce the
frequency. The area overhead is only 2–4 % (depending on the
target finite field size) with a 30 % speed-up compared to the
architecture from [10] on Virtex 5 FPGAs.
We plan to fully implement our new algorithm on a new
architecture, with configurable RNS operators which take
benefits from the very recent results of [11] for ECC in RNS.
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